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A tale of two destinies: Georgescu-Roegen on Gossen
Paola Tubaro
Abstract
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen edited the English translation of Gossen’s book The Laws of Human 
Relations (1983), and wrote a lengthy introduction to it. His highly appreciative, thoroughly 
documented study has become a major reference on an otherwise little known early writer. It 
suggests that Gossen was unjustly ignored by his contemporaries, just as Georgescu-Roegen felt 
that his own contributions to economics were insufficiently recognized. 
Yet it was not only a personal motive that inspired Georgescu-Roegen’s editorial 
enterprise: I show that his original plan was to build a model of consumer choice, with support 
of hints found in Gossen, to address what he saw as essential theoretical issues. Rather, 
completion of the book project took almost twenty years, during which external circumstances 
and analytical difficulties gradually eroded the initial theoretical interests, while a sense of self-
identification with Gossen gained prominence. As a result, major issues remained ultimately 
unsolved. History of economics, originally intended to aid economic theory-building, became 
the key for sublimating personal feelings into a broader reflection on science in society, beyond 
time and space differences.
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1. Introduction
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1906-1994) is mostly remembered today for his work on 
bioeconomics and its implications on natural resources management, sustainability, and 
growth. In the first decades of his career, he had also extensively investigated utility theory and 
consumer choice on the one hand, and production theory on the other, contributing 
substantially to both areas (see for a synthesis Maneschi and Zamagni 1997). His hope to 
receive, and belief that he fully deserved, the Nobel Prize – which he never did – was one that 
he widely voiced among colleagues at Vanderbilt University, especially towards the end of his 
career. And it was precisely in this period that he made a major contribution to history of 
economics, with the English edition of Hermann Heinrich Gossen’s book The Laws of Human 
Relations and the Rules of Human Action Derived Therefrom (1983). 
Georgescu-Roegen’s lengthy, thoroughly documented introductory essay to Gossen’s book 
has become a key reference on an otherwise obscure older writer. Gossen, customarily 
classified among early marginalist authors, was a German civil servant with hardly any ties to 
academic institutions. His book, written in isolation in over twenty years and published at his 
expense in 1854, failed to attract any attention and, despite some posthumous praise (most 
notably by William S. Jevons and Léon Walras), it has remained relatively little known.
Georgescu-Roegen’s essay conveys a distinctive sense of empathy between the author and 
his object of study. The reader can hardly escape the feeling that Gossen was unjustly ignored 
by his contemporaries, just as Georgescu-Roegen himself felt that his own contribution to 
economics was insufficiently recognized. His aspiration to win the Nobel Prize even appears 
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between the lines –it was not much through historical work per se that he was trying to attract 
attention towards his credentials, but in a much subtler way. 
But Georgescu-Roegen’s venture into history of economics is not only a story of personal 
feelings, let alone vanity. It was Gossen’s approach to consumer theory and utility that had 
triggered his enthusiasm in the first place. In previous writings, Georgescu-Roegen had sketched 
a novel approach to better incorporate time (and with it, the effects of experience and learning) 
into consumer models. Gossen’s own emphasis on time, human experience, and the finiteness 
of time as the fundamental source of economic scarcity, resonated with his own views. 
Georgescu-Roegen realized that some of Gossen’s ideas on time had gone almost unnoticed 
before, and had potential for further exploitation. The book project was, in fact, part of his 
broader theoretical and analytical effort to renew the economics of consumer choice and utility. 
In this article, I set out to reconstitute the unfolding of Georgescu-Roegen’s project to 
advance his own ideas with support of hints found in Gossen, the obstacles he encountered, 
and the changes in perspective, approach and focus he was led to make. To the best of my 
knowledge, there are no previous, systematic historical studies of this important episode in 
Georgescu-Roegen’s intellectual career.
I show that completion of Georgescu-Roegen’s editorial undertaking took almost twenty 
years and was highly convoluted – sharing a similar, unfortunate destiny with its own object, 
Gossen’s original book. During this time, Georgescu-Roegen’s outlook progressively changed: 
initially strong theoretical interests for consumer choice models eventually faded away, owing 
to his particular circumstances as well as to logical difficulties that emerged as analysis 
progressed. Meanwhile, the motive of self-identification with Gossen gradually gained 
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prominence. Still, Georgescu-Roegen never kept it confined to the personal sphere, and rather 
brought forth a universal perspective: he transcended his own affinities with Gossen to develop 
a far-reaching reflection on the place of knowledge and discovery in societies, past and present. 
His use of historical research to illuminate similarities between individual destinies across time 
and space became a means to reveal and comprehend social regularities more generally.
What, then, of the initially intended role of history of thought –that of supporting 
economic model-building? Undoubtedly, Georgescu-Roegen derived substantial insight from his 
increasingly intimate knowledge of Gossen’s book. He decidedly rejected the neoclassical 
consumer models and their graphical representations in modern textbooks in favor of Gossen’s, 
which took account of the effects of the passage of time on consumer preferences and 
behaviors. Unfortunately, he was unable to go much beyond Gossen in attempting to formally 
incorporate time and its effects in consumer theory –which is one of the reasons why his 
attention eventually shifted to the entirely different issue of scientific discovery in society. 
2. The Gossen publication project: a dramatic story
The published work – as can be consulted today – is a masterly example of the editing of 
economics texts and more generally, of history of economics scholarship. It is a joint enterprise 
of Georgescu-Roegen and his colleague Rudolph C. Blitz, who was also at Vanderbilt and was a 
native speaker of German. Blitz always acknowledged (in private correspondence as well as in 
his foreword to the book) that it was Georgescu-Roegen who first had the idea of working at the 
book and proposed it to him. The division of labor was almost naturally imposed by the distinct 
linguistic and theoretical skills of the two authors: Blitz would translate into English, and based 
on his work Georgescu-Roegen, who had limited command of German, would write an 
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extensive introductory essay. In practice, Georgescu-Roegen also assisted his colleague with the 
translation, which necessitated major editorial interventions, not least because the original 
German text had no division into chapters, and no numbering of figures, tables, theorems and 
equations. The result is a text that is heavily edited, but significantly improved and much more 
easily readable than the original. In turn, Blitz supported Georgescu-Roegen’s writing of the 
essay by providing not only the English text itself, but also translated summaries of existing 
German-language secondary literature on Gossen as well as substantial effort to search for 
additional historical and biographical sources. The book, including both the translation and 
Georgescu-Roegen’s essay, was published in 1983 by MIT Press.
In fact, this final product is the outcome of a long and tortuous process unfolding behind 
the scenes. In what follows, I reconstitute the sequence of events that ultimately led to 
publication, and identify reasons that explain its duration.
The origins of the project can be traced as far back as 1965. The idea to publish an English 
version of Gossen’s book, preceded by a lengthy introductory essay, was first discussed at the 
AEA annual meeting1, which took place at the end of December of that year in New York City. 
Georgescu-Roegen and Blitz met with Bert Hoselitz, who had translated Menger into English a 
few years before and was in the AEA translations committee at the time, and (following 
Hoselitz’s own advice) with the publisher Augustus M. Kelley. Following up those conversations, 
Blitz rapidly secured a publication contract with Kelley2, and obtained funding both from the 
AEA (through Hoselitz) and from Vanderbilt University3. The two colleagues were initially highly 
optimistic about the time and effort required to complete the project and expressed hope “that 
the book will be published before September 1967”4. Blitz promised Kelley “to put a draft into 
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your hands at the latest by March 1967. […] Professor Georgescu has assured me that he too 
would be able to complete his part of the manuscript by March”5. A first draft of Blitz’s 
translation was indeed ready by the summer 1966, even though Blitz himself admitted it needed 
improvement6.
Difficulties started to emerge in the next few years. In the fall 1970, Blitz had to reassure 
Hoselitz that the project was still going on and he hoped to complete it shortly: “I appreciate 
your concern about the translation of Gossen. I am now within 15 pages of completing my 
fourth revision of the text”7. Yet Kelley did not receive any draft until the summer of 19718, and 
Georgescu-Roegen had not even started writing his essay by this time. Nevertheless, Kelley was 
still interested and optimistic, and commented extensively on the draft translation when he 
finally received it9.
The first draft of Georgescu-Roegen’s essay saw the light only after Friedrich von Hayek 
provided a major unpublished source –a dissertation defended in Germany in 1931 whose 
author, Karl Robert Blum, used materials from archives of the public administrations where 
Gossen passed his professional qualification examinations and subsequently worked10. A very 
preliminary version of Georgescu-Roegen’s draft, with the date of June 1973, includes only a 
two-page introduction together with historical and biographical sections. A revision in 
September of the same year also adds a literature review and some theoretical sections. Two 
further drafts (the former with the date of 1976; the latter undated but very similar to the 
former, and probably immediately posterior), refine the theoretical analysis; yet comparison 
with the final, published version reveals that they are still rather different from it, and largely 
incomplete.
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At about this time, an external event posed the single most serious threat to completion of 
the project: “we have recently been confronted with the imprevisible –Mr. Kelley sold out the 
firm. The new owner wants to direct its activity in other directions and we thought that, 
gentlemen as Rudy and I are, we better renounce the contract” 11. Attempts by the two authors 
to find another publisher in 1976-77 (“Are you interested in the book?”12) did not yield any 
immediate results.
A positive turn came only in 1981, when MIT Press expressed an interest in publishing the 
book, seemingly through the decisive intermediation of Paul Samuelson13, a long-term friend of 
Georgescu-Roegen and a sincere admirer of his work, who had earlier on praised him as “a 
pioneer in mathematical economics” and “a scholar's scholar, an economist's economist” 
(foreword to Georgescu-Roegen 1966, vii). At MIT Press, “the only controversy about publishing 
the translation of Gossen's work was that it would be financially burdensome for it to 
undertake”14; yet funding from the National Endowment for the Humanities eventually made 
the project worthwhile15. The problem was rather that Georgescu-Roegen’s essay had not 
significantly progressed since the second version of 1976, and it was this one that was 
submitted to the MIT Press editorial team for a first review16 (“the draft consists rather of an 
assembly of ideas classified in a rather rough way into provisional chapters”17). MIT Press 
apparently put some pressure on him to finalize the work quickly –much to the discontent of 
Georgescu-Roegen who often disagreed with editors’ stylistic suggestions and experienced 
some difficulties in meeting his deadlines, partly because he no longer had secretarial assistance 
after his retirement18. In 1982, when the project was finally close to completion, MIT Press 
consulted Hayek to assess the project’s worthiness, possibly following a suggestion of 
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Georgescu-Roegen himself19. Hayek, who had himself written an introduction to a German 
edition of Gossen’s book fifty years earlier, congratulated Georgescu-Roegen for the quality of 
his work in a letter in which he confessed being “a little ashamed” for not having done an 
equally valuable job: “Wholly inexperienced in the job of editing as I then was (at 27 years of 
age) I did my best to collect all available information, but did not even have time to re-read the 
book whose importance I had recognized but which I had never really closely studied”20.
There is little doubt that this long interval was largely determined by practical obstacles. 
Blitz occasionally lamented his colleague’s lack of constancy and engagement in a project that 
he had himself launched21, but the linguistic barrier and Georgescu-Roegen’s dependence on 
Blitz’s translation account for his delay to a large extent. Blitz himself found the translation 
much more challenging and time-consuming than he initially expected (“the task of the 
translation turned out to be much more difficult than we originally anticipated”22). Furthermore, 
their search for historical and biographical sources on Gossen, on whom little was known 
before, yielded limited results: only the dissertation provided by Hayek, some secondary 
literature mostly in German, Hayek’s own preface, and an Italian translation by Tullio Bagiotti 
(1950). The two authors tried in vain to trace Walras’s French translation of Gossen, of which 
they had been informed by William Jaffé23: Georgescu-Roegen contacted the family of Georges 
Luftfalla who had been in possession of the manuscript, and was aware that it may have ended 
up in Luigi Einaudi’s collection, but did not manage to find more precise information24. Blitz had 
unsuccessfully tried to locate the grave of Gossen in Germany during a stay there in 1975-7625, 
and even to search for potential descendants –in particular a “Gossen” firm in Erlangen, first 
mentioned to him by Hayek but probably unrelated26. The loss of the contract with Kelley, busy 
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schedules and competing writing commitments – notably with Georgescu-Roegen’s research on 
bioeconomics, very active throughout the 1970s – add to the impediments. 
3. Georgescu-Roegen’s evolving view of Gossen
During this long period, did Georgescu-Roegen’s attitudes towards Gossen and his expectations 
for the editorial project change? I now discuss the emergence of a sense of commonality of 
destinies between Georgescu-Roegen and his object of study, and I show that it becomes 
detectable only at a relatively late stage in the history of the project. I subsequently provide 
evidence that Georgescu-Roegen’s initial motivation was theoretical and focused on the 
renewal of consumer theory; this interest was strongest at the very beginning, though, and lost 
intensity over time. 
3.1 The late emergence of a sense of shared destinies
The published version of the introductory essay opens with an “exordium” of about twenty 
pages entitled “Are there minds that may think above their time?” In a nutshell, the argument is 
as follows. In his History of Economic Analysis, Schumpeter judged that some economists 
including Gossen “wrote above their times”; so did Böhm-Bawerk (Georgescu-Roegen 1983, xii). 
Yet this very possibility is “in direct contradiction to […] the ‘sociology of knowledge’” of Robert 
K. Merton and others (Georgescu-Roegen 1983, xii). Georgescu-Roegen did not conceal his 
criticisms of what he saw as the main tenet of this discipline, namely “the inevitability of any 
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discovery when the existentialist basis is just ripe for it” (Georgescu-Roegen 1983, xii) or more 
sarcastically, the idea that “Hamlet would have had to be written by someone else had 
Shakespeare not existed” (Georgescu-Roegen 1983, xiii). Admittedly, Georgescu-Roegen 
criticized this tenet in its strongest form and gave little consideration to any nuances that 
sociologists of knowledge may have introduced, but an appraisal of the accuracy of his 
argument would be beyond the scope of this article. Here, it is rather important to stress his 
claim that multiple discoveries are no more likely to be observed than “singletons”. Discovery is 
so complex that what seems at first sight to be similar may in fact not be so. Take the Jevons-
Menger-Walras triad, typically credited to have brought about the so-called marginalist 
revolution: a closer look at their respective works reveals that they are very dissimilar, and “it 
was only much later that their contributions were consolidated into the general law as we know 
it today” (Georgescu-Roegen 1983, xvii). As a matter of fact, he insisted, we are much more 
likely to observe singletons: “any discovery, small or great, must, by definition, be in some sense 
above its time” (Georgescu-Roegen 1983, xviii). Precisely for this reason, it is all the more likely 
to face hostility, incomprehension, or oblivion – as was the case with Gossen.
Interestingly, this exordium was absent from the earlier drafts of 1973 and 1976, which all 
started with a much shorter introduction of about two pages: hence, it must have been added 
in 1982, just before publication. To be sure, the previous drafts also expressed regret for the 
neglect of Gossen, and reproached economists for failing to recognize his merits. Yet in the early 
stages of the project, Georgescu-Roegen’s focus was on the peculiar fate of one particularly 
unlucky man. His switch to a wider sociological reflection and the reference to Merton in the 
final version of 1982 suggest instead that he was adopting a universal perspective: Gossen’s 
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destiny may not have been unique but rather the expression of a social regularity, revealing 
some deeper tendency in the way in which human communities organize the production and 
dissemination of knowledge. In this sense, his may be the destiny of all “minds above their 
times” –including Georgescu-Roegen himself. It was only at this late stage, then, that the 
personal motive of self-identification with Gossen gained relevance, visibility, and even scientific 
dignity as it was incorporated in a broader reflection on knowledge and society.
3.2 Theoretical affinities fade away with time
If Georgescu-Roegen’s sense of self-identification with Gossen and its sociological legitimation 
appeared late, his initial interest in the book was entirely theoretically driven: he repeatedly and 
openly expressed his great admiration for Gossen’s endeavor to build a consumer theory that 
could account for time and its effects on preferences and behaviors. A colorful detail helps 
introduce this point. In the preface to his book, Gossen had grandiloquently claimed that “I 
believe I have accomplished for the explanation of the relations among humans what a 
Copernicus was able to accomplish for the explanation of the relations of the heavenly bodies”. 
Readers have invariably smiled at this pretension, but Georgescu-Roegen did not hesitate to 
point the finger at them in all his drafts of 1973 through 1976: “the claim is apt to offer the 
substance of a good joke, for Copernici in any field do not proclaim themselves as such. Yet in 
this case the joke should turn against those who may have joked about Gossen’s claim. He is the 
Copernicus of economics”27. Surprising and by all measures extreme, this position is replaced 
with a more moderate one in the published version: “we have often smiled at Gossen and even 
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ridiculed him, but, given the exceptional value of his contribution, the persiflage should turn 
against the ridiculers” (Georgescu-Roegen 1983, lxv).
More generally, it was between the late 1960s and early 1970s that Georgescu-Roegen 
made use of his work on Gossen in his research. Figure 1 below provides a graphical sketch of 
the timeline. The lower panel represents his involvement in the book project, with start in 1965, 
drafts of the introductory essay in 1973 and 1976, and publication in 1983. The upper panel 
outlines occurrences of references to Gossen in other articles or essays of Georgescu-Roegen. 
The 1954 article is the first to mention Gossen, and does so only briefly; the 1985 one, published 
in an Italian journal, is a reprint of part of the introduction to the 1983 book. The articles written 
in the period 1968-73, instead, contain longer developments on Gossen, and Georgescu-
Roegen’s correspondence of this period clearly indicates that they benefited from the ongoing 
translation project, while in turn nourishing the theoretical reflection that informed the drafts of 
the introductory essay. To corroborate this point, consider also that most of Georgescu-
Roegen’s work on utility was done before the mid-1970s, and that all his subsequent research 
(apart from autobiographies and retrospective reflections) is in other areas. It is then 
unsurprising that the bulk of Georgescu-Roegen’s theoretical work on Gossen was done in this 
time period, while only refinements and minor details were added later.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
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4. Theoretical challenges: renewing consumer theory
If Georgescu-Roegen had developed an interest in Gossen in the early phases of the editorial 
project, what was it that he found stimulating, and how did he expect to integrate suggestions 
from Gossen into his own research? To answer this question, I first review the work that 
Georgescu-Roegen had already done on utility theory; then I present Gossen’s contribution, 
placing emphasis on the points that Georgescu-Roegen discussed most extensively; and finally, I 
assess the achievements and limitations of Georgescu-Roegen’s endeavor on Gossen. 
4.1 Georgescu-Roegen’s approach to consumer theory
By the time he started working at the Gossen project, Georgescu-Roegen had written 
extensively on utility theory and made substantial contributions to the topic. A first, 
authoritative article was published in 1936 on the so-called integrability problem in demand 
theory. In sum, the question under scrutiny was whether it would be possible to recover 
indifference maps from the conditions of consumer equilibrium. A detailed account of 
Georgescu-Roegen’s argument would be outside the reach of this article; the interested reader 
may wish to consult Zamagni (1999) and Hands (2006). It suffices here to briefly mention that 
Georgescu-Roegen demonstrated that there is no general solution to this problem unless 
preferences are transitive; however, the assumption of transitivity is unrealistic as it requires 
consumers to make comparisons over large changes in quantities of goods. This, said 
Georgescu-Roegen, is highly unlikely: humans have a “psychological threshold” of perceptions, 
including valuations of goods. They are not in a position to contemplate and consider the whole 
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choice set but only minor variations among a smaller set of available bundles of goods –“local 
knowledge” in modern parlance. To take this limitation into account, he suggested a new 
approach, which he christened the theory of “directional choice” and in which indifference 
surfaces are not given but evolve endogenously over time depending on the consumer’s past 
experiences of consumption. It is only by experimenting with different goods and combinations 
of them, that the consumer learns to refine his or her preferences, and adapts choice. This 
requires, however, a shift in emphasis relative to traditional theory, in which the consumer is 
supposedly aware of all consumption opportunities and makes the best choice out of them, so 
that any observed position in the choice space must be an equilibrium position. In directional 
choice theory, instead, the consumer can be initially in a disequilibrium position and can move 
from there, so that movements in the choice space are real movements in real time. 
Georgescu’s analogy, comparing the two theories to the actions of, respectively, a bird and a 
worm, is illuminating: in conventional theory, 
“choice is analogous to that of a bird which, after surveying from above a large piece of 
ground, dives directly at the most preferred spot. In the theory of directional choice, 
man’s choice is rather like that of a worm which, from any position, chooses some 
direction and then moves along it” (Georgescu 1968a, 255). 
Time must be placed at the heart of economic analysis as it is only over a period of time 
that the consumer can experiment with different goods and allow preferences to evolve.
Later on (1954), Georgescu-Roegen took up lexicographic preferences, plausible insofar as 
they represent the irreducibility of human needs. Traditional utility theory unifies all sorts of 
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needs by pretending they are interchangeable, so that utility is the notion that summarizes all of 
them. Still, “he who does not have enough to eat cannot satisfy his hunger by wearing more 
shirts” (Georgescu-Roegen 1973a, 457). It is better, suggested the author, to move towards a 
conception that draws attention to a series of distinct wants, rather than just one (utility), 
following in this the original insight of early marginalist authors from Daniel Bernoulli to Carl 
Menger. Because human needs can be ranked on a scale going from the most basic ones (food, 
drink, shelter) to progressively more sophisticated ones, they will tend to be met in succession: 
therefore, consumption choices will follow paths in which basic needs are satisfied first, and 
other needs come sequentially. As a result, past choices will always affect current choices by 
determining the starting point, even when preferences themselves do not change. Georgescu-
Roegen’s defense of lexicographic preferences is another way to regard time as a major 
determinant of consumer choice, adding strength to the idea that there must be some form of 
hysteresis, an effect of the time arrow such that past actions are irreversible, at least to an 
extent. Since lexicographic preferences are not amenable to conventional representations of 
utility and in fact, are the textbook example of a case in which indifference curves are hardly 
meaningful, this point reinforces Georgescu-Roegen’s mistrust towards conventional utility 
theory and its analytical tools.
In sum, Georgescu-Roegen’s early work on utility and consumption had led him to believe 
that there was an unmet need for a better way to integrate time (and with it experience, 
evolving preferences and learning processes) into economic analysis. In his 1968 entry on 
“Utility” in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, he wrote: “There is little doubt 
that by far the greatest amount of work still to be done in utility theory concerns the time 
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factor” (Georgescu-Roegen 1968a, 250). More generally, he had grown increasingly dissatisfied 
with the standard approach to utility, based as it was on the notion of indifference which he 
considered flawed: in this sense, he believed the shift from the older cardinalist to the newer 
ordinalist approach with Pareto and his followers had not brought as much improvement as was 
generally believed. 
4.2 Insight from Gossen?
How, then, could Georgescu-Roegen avail himself of Gossen in support of his program to 
develop a theory of directional choice centered on time, experience, and irreversibility? To 
answer this question, it is first necessary to briefly present Gossen and his contribution, placing 
emphasis on those aspects that Georgescu-Roegen was most interested in.
The book starts with what commentators, from the late nineteenth century onwards, have 
taken the habit of calling “Gossen’s First Law”: a postulate, traditionally interpreted as roughly 
equivalent to the principle of decreasing marginal utility. Interestingly, however, Gossen stated 
it first in terms of time rather than quantities of goods: as an activity is pursued continuously 
over time, the enjoyment it yields decreases steadily until satiety is ultimately reached (Gossen 
1983, 6). The more familiar version, in which marginal utility diminishes with the quantity of 
goods, is not a primitive principle in Gossen but is derived from the diminishing intensity of 
utility over time (Gossen 1983, 35). The latter can be regarded as more general (Georgescu-
Roegen 1983, lxxx): it is because Gossen had first defined the psychological relation between 
utility and time, assumed to hold for any kind of enjoyable activity, that he could subsequently 
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take into account that time is needed to consume commodities –a concern rarely found in 
modern economics. 
The First Law can be represented graphically as a negatively-sloped schedule in a diagram 
in which time (or quantity of a good) is on the abscissa, and marginal utility on the ordinate 
(curve cb in Figure 2a). Georgescu-Roegen who had long discussed the respective merits of 
ordinalist and cardinalist approaches in his earlier writings (see above) stresses that as originally 
formulated, Gossen’s principles do not need any assumption of cardinality:
“the time represented on the horizontal axis […] need not be clock-time; time as a pure 
flow ordered only by the subjective relation ‘earlier than’ will do. Nor need the feelings of 
pleasure at any moment in life be cardinally measurable; it suffices that these feelings 
be ordinally comparable” (Georgescu-Roegen 1983, lxxx).
The cb curve can be shifted upwards or downwards with no major consequences on the 
main result; and it is required only to be downward-sloping without any other restrictions on its 
shape (though for simplicity’s sake, Gossen often assumed linearity). Georgescu-Roegen insisted 
on the originality of this formulation relative to other versions of the principle of decreasing 
marginal utility, which assumed cardinality along both the vertical and horizontal axes (1983, 
lxxx). However, he admitted that the original text of Gossen is at times hesitant and even 
contradictory on these matters (Georgescu-Roegen 1983, lxxxiv). In particular to compare the 
utility derived from different goods or enjoyable activities, Gossen reintroduced a form of 
measurability assuming that “any mathematical magnitude […] consists of atoms and that the 
atoms can be separated one by one and rearranged at will” (Georgescu-Roegen 1983, lxix). 
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Gossen’s atomism can be somewhat excused for ignoring the mathematical notion of 
continuity, not yet known in the mid-nineteenth century; but a more serious inconsistency “was 
his further assumption that one atom of, say, milk is equal to an atom of, say, coal” (1983, lxix). 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Gossen also provided a simple, clever graphical solution to the question of how to allocate 
one’s time in order to maximize total utility, when several activities are available but time is 
limited and does not allow reaching satiety for all of them. Again, this is easily generalized to the 
problem of the optimal allocation of a scarce factor among distinct uses; the fact that Gossen 
took time as his starting point gives unity to his whole thought, indicating that the origin of 
scarcity is time alone, and all other material shortages are just consequences of it (Georgescu-
Roegen 1983, lxv). Gossen’s optimal solution expresses the principle that the end intensities of 
pleasure in each use must be equal (Gossen 1983, 14). While the general principle is correct, 
Gossen’s solution is unsatisfactory when it comes to actually comparing the pleasures resulting 
from qualitatively different enjoyments, as he simply assumed that atoms of any two goods are 
equal. Yet he “hit on the correct idea” (Georgescu-Roegen 1983, xciv) when, having introduced 
money and a price system, he drew the conclusion that the last unit of money spent in each 
enjoyment must provide the same intensity of pleasure. This proposition can be translated 
algebraically to state that the optimal allocation of income over different goods must be such 
that the ratio of marginal utility and price is the same for each good, a solution that has since 
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then become standard in economics literature. The graphical device that Gossen propounded to 
illustrate this point (figure 2b28) is also found in other authors, notably Jevons, Philip Wicksteed 
and Knut Wicksell; Georgescu-Roegen reproduced it both in his 1968 Utility entry in the 
Encyclopedia, and in an article in the Southern Economic Journal of the same year. He even 
referred to it in a letter to Paul Samuelson of 1974, to criticize a point in a draft paper by the 
latter29. Georgescu-Roegen summarized the reasons for his appreciation of the diagram, alluding 
to his own criticisms of the indifference notion:
“Gossen’s diagrams are no longer found in the recent economic manuals because the 
problem of allocation is now explained with the help of the indifference map. Yet Gossen’s 
diagram reaches deeper into the relationship between allocation and utility and is 
therefore the most efficacious tool for any argument that may safely assume the 
independence of utilities” (Georgescu-Roegen 1983, xci).
Gossen’s solution had customarily been referred to in the literature as “Gossen’s Second 
Law”, a label that Georgescu-Roegen strongly criticized because of the confusion it induces: 
indeed the Second Law is a theorem, while the First Law is a postulate.
Ignoring traditional usage, Georgescu-Roegen applied the term Second Law to a different 
mechanism for diminishing utility (also a postulate): “If a previous enjoyment is repeated after 
an interruption, the intensity-of-pleasure schedule shifts, depending on the individual’s previous 
experiences of enjoyment. The sooner the repetition, the larger the shift”. With reference to 
figure 2c30, this would mean that the intensity of pleasure would be represented by c’b’ instead 
of cb. In this perspective, Gossen suggested (but did not prove) that it may in principle be 
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possible for an individual to identify the optimal frequency of repetition of activities, thereby 
maximizing enjoyment over one’s lifetime. Gossen also suggested that there may be forms of 
learning, so that exercising the sensory organs helps the intensities of pleasure become greater.
Georgescu-Roegen considered this mechanism as Gossen’s single most important 
innovation. The underlying idea that consumer choice “is intertwined with a continuous process 
of learning or, rather, of discovering one’s own latent structure of pleasure” (Georgescu-Roegen 
1983, lxxxv) obviously resonated with his earlier plea for a theory in which utility (or 
preferences) change as a result of past experiences. This is the main reason why, in his early 
drafts, he had insisted on comparing Gossen to Copernicus: 
“He is the Copernicus of economics. Like Copernicus, he was the man of one idea, only, as 
Edgeworth rightly judged [...], that idea was a genial one. One can even detect some 
immense pride in the direct and unreserved way in which Jevons recognized that Gossen 
had anticipated him. [...] The same applies to Walras. [...]. The whole truth, however, is 
that in at least one respect –namely, what I shall later on call Gossen’s Second Law– he 
anticipated nobody, simply because that particular point has not been thought up by 
anyone else31.”  
Georgescu-Roegen’s introduction incorrectly suggests that this principle is unique to 
Gossen among marginalist writers, and escaped notice by later commentators: “no one is 
known to have said anything even approaching it before him, or after him, for what matters” 
(1983, lxxxiv). However, versions of this law can be found in other early neoclassical economists, 
most prominently Maffeo Pantaleoni who explicitly attributed it to Gossen (1898, 28-38), and 
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Francis Y. Edgeworth (1967, 62). They interpreted it rather in terms of quantities of goods, 
meaning that the functional relationship between different quantities of a good and the amount 
of pleasure they yield in a given time period shifts according to individual previous experiences 
of consumption of that same good (Bruni and Sudgen 2007). Hands (2008) adds that traces of 
this principle can be found in consumer theory even later, until about the 1930s. 
Be that as it may, Georgescu-Roegen’s account of the reasons why the Second Law was 
disregarded is of interest in itself. His 1973-76 drafts suggest that this was just part of the 
neglect of which Gossen had been a (particularly unfortunate) victim; the published version, 
however, rather points to the formidable challenges that would arise if one tried to explore it 
mathematically (“its complexity does not allow the economic theorist to get much mileage from 
it”, Georgescu-Roegen 1983, lxxxv). He attempted to formalize and solve Gossen’s problem of 
finding the frequency of repetition of enjoyments that would maximize utility over one’s 
lifetime. However his argument, found both in the drafts and the published version, does not 
reach any universal solution, and suggests that the problem can be treated only in an ad hoc 
manner. He openly pointed to the need of renovating the set of mathematical and analytical 
tools available to economists, so as to make dynamic problems tractable: 
“there is no way to represent this learning process by the ordinary tools of mathematics; 
the most we can do is to illustrate it by a simile [...]. But even if we abstract from this 
process, as has been done in the few attempts to study preferences among time 
sequences of utilities, one has to introduce simplifying assumptions of scarcely any degree 
of realism” (Georgescu-Roegen 1983, lxxxvi).
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4.3 Mixed results 
To summarize, Georgescu-Roegen believed that Gossen’s thought centered on time purported a 
potentially fruitful approach to the question of how utility could change with time, and provided 
a framework of analysis which, though somewhat primitive, was exempt from the flaws of the 
ordinalist, indifference-curve based, approach. Gossen’s book offered a background for his 
claim that it was essential to rebuild the foundations of consumer choice theory so as to fully 
include time and its consequences –experience, learning, and irreversibility. In particular, 
Georgescu-Roegen saw potential for the Second Law to be developed further, and his effort to 
prove the general theorem of lifetime enjoyment optimization can be seen as a first step in this 
direction. 
However as already mentioned, Georgescu-Roegen reached no general solution to the 
problem of optimizing time use over one’s lifespan. As mentioned above, a major difficulty was 
the lack of mathematical and analytical tools that are adequate enough to model dynamic 
phenomena. Georgescu-Roegen was famously aware of the limitations of mathematics, an issue 
that he repeatedly raised in the last decades of his life; but he did not go as far as to experiment 
with alternative tools and remained a traditionalist, so to speak, in terms of methods. 
What’s more, Gossen’s approach did not offer sufficient help to build a convincing case for 
support of an alternative consumer theory, with respect to the existing approach based on 
indifference curves. For all its novelty and interest, it was not exempt from all the problems of 
early marginalism. The aforementioned atomism is a first example of these difficulties; another 
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is the imperfect correspondence between total and marginal utility, which Georgescu-Roegen 
discussed at length: if it is mathematically straightforward to see that the curve cb corresponds 
to the marginal concept and the surface below it to the total concept, a substantive 
interpretation would require some mechanism for “accumulating” utility, so that the notion of 
total utility would correspond to a real psychological experience. In a sense, then, most of the 
problems that were open in 1965, when the book project started, were still largely unsolved in 
1983, when it finished.
5. Conclusions 
Like Gossen whom he much admired, Georgescu-Roegen was at the forefront of the 
development of consumer theory. He spotted essential problems as early as 1936, when the 
standard utility maximization model was still in the process of being built, and many of its pillars 
as they are found in today’s textbooks, had yet to see the light. With his theory of directional 
choice, he identified a path to be explored for further analytical progress, and raised important 
challenges. His emphasis on time and its effects on preferences and choices was the unifying 
principle of his view of how consumer theory should be rebuilt, and his work on Gossen was 
part of this endeavor. 
However during his lifetime, Georgescu-Roegen failed to convince the profession of the 
need for profound theoretical change that he had advocated. To be sure, some economists did 
take up the indications of his theory of directional choice, developing them towards various 
theoretical objectives (see for a brief review Zamagni 1999, 105); yet a larger majority remained 
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faithful to the mainstream approach. At times, Georgescu-Roegen regretted this explicitly: for 
example, when in an important book on preferences, utility, and demand, edited by John 
Chipman and allegedly representing “the most up-to-date statement” of consumer theory, 
“highly important topics such as […] the time factor […] have been completely left out” 
(Georgescu-Roegen 1973b, 529). One reason for the reserved reception of Georgescu-Roegen’s 
ideas is that his starting point, the integrability problem in demand theory, had been dismissed 
by many as little relevant: Hicks (1939, 19) considered it a “will-o’-the-wisp”, and so did 
Houthakker and others (Zamagni 1999, 110-111; Hands 2006). Another reason is his growingly 
confrontational stance towards other economists which, especially in the last decades of his life, 
hindered successful communication and penetration of his views (Iglesias 2009).
The Gossen editorial project hardly contributed to reviving awareness of Georgescu-
Roegen’s approach to utility theory. Its long duration and the numerous practical difficulties 
encountered throughout the process, together with his growing focus on the new area of 
bioeconomics, distracted attention from the theoretical issues that had brought him to study 
Gossen in the first place. By the mid-seventies, it was no longer obvious to all that utility theory, 
“the topic that has been my liebling thema”32, was one of his major theoretical interests, and he 
often felt the need to specify it explicitly (“My first field was utility theory”33).
When the book finally came out, it was well-received: Laurence Moss wrote a positive 
review (“Collaborators Blitz and Georgescu-Roegen along with the editors deserve our gratitude 
and praise for this handsome and authoritative volume”, 1984, 1132), and there was a session 
on “New perspectives on H.H. Gossen, The Laws of Human Relations (1854)” at the 1984 AEA 
meetings in Dallas. However, little else happened. The book is now out of print and even used 
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copies are unavailable for purchase, either from the publisher or from major online retailers. 
Google Scholar reports only 68 citations34, a tiny number compared to more than 3000 for 
Georgescu-Roegen’s 1971 book on The Entropy Law and the Economic Process, and more than 
400 for his 1966 Analytical Economics.
As a result, the book is less remembered today for its contribution to utility theory, than 
for Georgescu-Roegen’s thoughts on discovery and the place of outliers in the sociology of 
knowledge, with the related plea for systematic recognition of scientific merit as an essential 
ethical and professional requirement. It should not be inferred, though, that Georgescu-
Roegen’s exercise in history of economics was of little use: rather, it was on the basis of it that 
he could generalize his argument on the place of science in society. His effort unveils a 
potentially large range of possible uses of history of economics –not necessarily successful in 
contributing to economic theory-building but feeding into more diverse avenues of inquiry, 
possibly involving neighboring disciplines and their relationships with economics.
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